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Abstract
Instrumental variable estimation requires untestable exclusion restrictions.
With policy eﬀects on individual outcomes, there is typically a time inter-
val between the moment the agent realizes that he may be exposed to the
policy and the actual exposure or the announcement of the actual treat-
ment status. In such cases there is an incentive for the agent to acquire
information on the value of the IV. This leads to violation of the exclu-
sion restriction. We analyze this in a dynamic economic model framework.
This provides a foundation of exclusion restrictions in terms of economic
behavior. The results are used to describe policy evaluation settings in
which instrumental variables are likely or unlikely to make sense. For the
latter cases we analyze the asymptotic bias. The exclusion restriction is
more likely to be violated if the outcome of interest strongly depends on
interactions between the agent’s eﬀort before the outcome is realized and
the actual treatment status. The bias has the same sign as this interaction
eﬀect. Violation does not causally depend on the weakness of the candidate
instrument or the size of the average treatment eﬀect. With experiments,
violation is more likely if the treatment and control groups are to be of
similar size. We also address side-eﬀects. We develop a novel economic
interpretation of placebo eﬀects and provide some empirical evidence for
the relevance of the analysis.
∗Free University Amsterdam, IFAU-Uppsala, IZA, IFS, CREST, and CEPR.
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11 Introduction
Instrumental variable estimation has since long been a standard econometric
technique for dealing with endogeneity and selection issues in general, and for
non-experimental policy evaluation in particular (see e.g. Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin, 1996, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, and Blundell and MaCurdy,
1999, for surveys). Basically, if one is interested in the eﬀect of a “treatment
variable” on an outcome variable, and the treatment is not exogenously assigned,
then one may perform causal inference by exploiting the presence of variables
that causally aﬀect the treatment status but do not have a direct causal eﬀect on
the outcome. The latter restriction is called an exclusion restriction. Exclusion
restrictions are identifying restrictions, so they can not be tested.1 This means
that empirical results critically depend on the validity of the exclusion restriction,
and that this restriction needs to be justiﬁed on a priori grounds.
With policy eﬀects on individual outcomes, there is typically a time interval
between the moment the agent realizes that he may be exposed to the policy and
the actual exposure. For example, unemployed workers are aware of the existence
of policies leading to treatments at some point of time in the future. As long as
the instrumental variable aﬀecting the treatment does not have a causal eﬀect
on the individual’s behavior, the exclusion restriction is not violated. Often, a
suﬃcient condition for this is that the agent does not observe the value of the
instrumental variable. However, there is an incentive for the agent to acquire
information on this value. After all, the probability of exposure to treatment
is a determinant of the optimal strategy, and the more the agent knows about
it, the better he can ﬁne-tune his behavior in response to this, and the higher
his expected present value will be. The agent’s strategy aﬀects the outcome
of interest. Thus, the acquisition of the value of the variable that is used by
the econometrician as instrumental variable leads to violation of the exclusion
restriction and to incorrect empirical inference.2
As an example, consider participation in a job search assistance program for
1We abstract from the use of testable restrictions on the joint distribution of the observables,
as captured by bounds for binary settings; see e.g. Robins and Greenland (1996) for a brief
overview.
2Earlier studies mentioning similar arguments, tacitly assuming that acquisition is free,
include Abbring and Van den Berg (2003). Modelling that agents use available information on
determinants of future (policy) events that aﬀect the outcome of interest goes back to at least
the rational expectations literature; see e.g. Hansen and Sargent (1980). Note that we are not
concerned with mechanical program lock-in eﬀects that may aﬀect the outcomes of participants
before the end of the actual treatment participation.
2unemployed individuals, where the policy intensity diﬀers across two otherwise
identical geographical regions. For example, in one region, the budget for the
program per potential participant may be larger, so that the individual proba-
bility of being treated is larger, holding everything else constant. An individual
may be aware of the distribution of policy intensities but not know his personally
relevant intensity, in which cases a regional dummy indicator may be a valid in-
strumental variable. If the individual ﬁnds out his relevant intensity then he will
typically use this information before the treatment is realized. For example, it
may be optimal to reduce the job search eﬀort more if the treatment probability
is large, because it is cheaper to provide eﬀort after the treatment. This may
lead to an under-estimation of the program eﬀect on the employment rate say
one year after inﬂow into unemployment.
In this paper we investigate, in the context of a dynamic economic framework,
under which conditions it is optimal for the agent to acquire the value of the in-
tended instrumental variable. This provides a foundation of exclusion restrictions
in terms of economic behavior that takes costs and beneﬁts into account. The
results are used to describe the policy evaluation settings in which instrumental
variables are likely or unlikely to make sense. This is especially useful since by
deﬁnition no empirical evidence is available on the validity of exclusion restric-
tions. We also analyze the asymptotic bias of the instrumental variable estimator
in case of violation of the exclusion restriction.
At ﬁrst sight one may think that information acquisition does not take place
if and only if the acquisition costs are high, and that therefore the conclusion is
simply going to be that instrumental variables estimation is particularly useful
to study policy eﬀects for agents with scarce resources. For active labor market
policy analysis this would mean that it is particularly useful for agents at the
bottom of the labor market, which coincides with the target groupof most of
these policy measures. However, this line of reasoning ignores the role of the
value of the information that is acquired. We show that this leads to a diﬀerent
set of conclusions. The results point at the importance of the extent to which
the treatment status and the agent’s eﬀort interact in the outcome.
The literature on instrumental variable estimation has recently been con-
cerned with the use of so-called weak instruments, i.e. instrumental variables
that are only weakly related to the treatment status (see e.g. Stock, Wright and
Yogo, 2002, for a survey). Is is sometimes argued that weak instruments have the
advantage that they are less likely to be used by agents as direct causal inputs
into the outcome of interest. We argue that in certain cases this line of reasoning
is incorrect, and therefore this advantage of weak instruments may have been
3over-estimated.
Our results can be straightforwardly applied to situations in which the treat-
ment variable is not a policy variable. Also, the costs of information may cover
not only monetary costs but also other types of eﬀort.3
We extend the framework and the results in a number of directions. First,
notice that the outcome is a function of the agent’s eﬀorts and the treatment
status. In the baseline analyses, we assume that the expected utility that an agent
ultimately derives from a certain combination of eﬀort and treatment is the same
as the expected value of the corresponding outcome. For example, an unemployed
individual may only be concerned about the probability of ﬁnding work, which is
also the outcome in which the researcher is interested. This assumption is in line
with dynamic economic theories such as job search theory. However, an agent
may also be concerned about side-eﬀects of the treatment that are not reﬂected
in the measured outcome. We therefore extend the model to allow the agent’s
ultimate utility to be systematically diﬀerent from the corresponding outcome.
This extension also covers cases in which the agent does not know the treatment
eﬀect and can only guess it, as is the case in medical trials and pilot experimental
evaluations of novel labor market programs. In all of these cases, the decision
whether to acquire the value of the candidate instrument is driven by the agent’s
utility function, whereas the magnitude of the asymptotic bias also depends on
the actual eﬀects of eﬀort and treatment on the outcome.
Throughout the paper we use the above example about participation in a
job search assistance program as the leading example. Essentially equivalent
examples concern the evaluation of training programs for unemployed workers
and punitive sanctions and monitoring programs for unemployment insurance
recipients (where the treatment is a punitive sanction and the policy intensity
of interest is the intensity with which agents’ search eﬀort is monitored). The
corresponding empirical literature contains many cases in which region is used as
an instrument. A similar example concerns the use of geographical distance to
college as an instrument to study the returns to education. In this case, parents of
children who live far from a college may provide substitute educational support.
3Of course, exclusion restrictions for instrumental variable estimation may be violated for
other reasons than those considered in this paper. Notably, the agent’s value of the candidate
instrument may be aﬀected by unobserved characteristics of the agent that have a direct causal
eﬀect on the outcome variable. (This is prevented if the candidate instrument is the result
of a deliberate randomization, like a deliberately randomized intention-to-treat variable in a
social experiment.) Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) consider violations in a dynamic setup that
are due to events occurring between the treatment and the outcome, whereas we are primarily
concerned with behavior before realization of the treatment.
4Clearly, the analysis covers randomized experiments with delayed treatment
as well. There is also some relevance for the evaluation of (double-)blind experi-
ments of say a medication to treat a disease, where the randomized intention to
treat equals the treatment status, the treatment is immediate, and the treatment
status is supposed to be unobserved until the outcome is observed. In the case of
life-threatening diseases, an individual has an incentive to ﬁnd out whether he re-
ceives medication or a placebo, for example by sending one tablet to a laboratory.
If he discovers that he receives a placebo then he may choose a diﬀerent lifestyle,
which in turn aﬀects the outcome. Another option is to share the tablets among
participating individuals. See Epstein (1996) and Schuklenk (2003) for examples
concerning experiments of AIDS medication, and Schulz (1995) for a pervasive
account of the high occurrence of deciphering in general. This can be trans-
lated into our model framework. Our results concerning the determinants of the
asymptotic eﬀect bias can be used to understand the (sign of the) observed asso-
ciation between the treatment eﬀect estimate and the degree of methodological
quality of the study (see e.g. Schulz et al., 1995, and Schulz and Grimes, 2002).
The mechanisms described above should be distinguished from non-compliance
upon assignment of the treatment status, when the actual treatment status is ob-
served by the analyst. Under certain conditions, IV estimation can accommodate
selective non-compliance (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Nevertheless, it is interest-
ing to study the determinants of non-compliance behavior, and we show that our
model framework is amenable to this purpose. In particular, we brieﬂy consider
when agents selectively choose to become non-compliers if they are able to use in-
formation on determinants of the treatment assignment process. This establishes
a relation to the literature on rational non-compliance behavior in experiments
(see in particular Philipson and DeSimone, 1997, and Chan and Hamilton, 2006,
for elaborate dynamic learning models).
We also relate to the literature on placebo eﬀects. We provide an economic
explanation for so-called placebo eﬀects in experiments. This does not assume
the availability of information on the treatment status, but instead rests on the
principle that agents rationally use information on the randomization probability
to adjust their behavior towards maximization of their expected present value.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model framework,
Section 3 derives the results concerning information acquisition, Section 4 dis-
cusses the implications for instrumental variable estimation, notably the asymp-
totic bias of the estimator in case of violation of the exclusion restriction. We also
discuss valid testing of the null hypothesis of no causal treatment eﬀect. Section
5 concludes.
52 The model framework
The main insights and results can be derived in a simple model framework with
three time periods.
Consider an assignment process leading to the actual treatment status of an
agent or decision maker.4 We assume that this process depends on a variable
Z. At the onset of the ﬁrst period, Z is realized separately for each agent. We
take the distribution of Z as exogenously given and assume that Z is dispersed,
so var(Z) > 0. Z is the candidate instrumental variable. Each agent knows the
distribution of Z across all agents. However, an agent does not necessarily know
his own realization of Z. More precisely, in Period 1, each agent decides whether
to acquire information on Z at cost γ>0o rn o t .
At the onset of Period 2, the agent determines his optimal strategy or eﬀort a.
The agent may or may not know his private value of Z when determining a, but
we assume that in Period 2 the agent does not know yet his treatment status X.
Without this assumption the analysis would be irrelevant, because there would
never be any incentive to acquire information on the policy intensity. As we shall
see, the analysis can allow for additional time periods and for agents to modify
their strategy upon learning their value of X, as long as their behavior before
learning X has an eﬀect on the outcome. The eﬀort a involves costs c(a)t ob e
pa i di nP e r i o d2 .
In Period 3, the agent’s actual treatment status X is realized. Both a and X
aﬀect the outcome Y , which is also realized in Period 3, simultaneously with or
after the realization of X. We express the outcome Y given X = x and given a as
W ·f(x,a)+ε,w i t h0≤ f(x,a)a n d0<W<∞.H e r eW is just a multiplicative
constant in the outcomes, and we merely introduce it to facilitate the analysis of
eﬀects of multiplicative changes in the outcomes. In the ﬁrst leading example, f
may be the probability of making an income gain, and W may be the expected
income gain. The term ε is an idiosyncratic outcome component. We assume
that E(ε|Z) = 0, but all other determinants of X may be correlated to ε.T h e
latter dependence captures the endogeneity of the actual treatment.
Summarizing, the sequence of events is as follows: the treatment assignment
intensity Z is realized, Z is acquired or not, the eﬀort a is chosen, the treatment
X is realized, and the outcome Wf(x,a)+ε is realized.
The above framework gives rise to a “reduced form” treatment evaluation
model. First, as will become clear below, we may assume without loss of gener-
4The model can be expressed in terms of counterfactual outcomes; see Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin (1996) for an exposition.
6ality that E(X|Z = z)=z. This leads to a “treatment equation”,
X = Z + ω (1)
where E(ω|Z) = 0. Secondly, we have an “outcome equation”,
Y = Wf(X,a)+ε (2)
with E(ε|Z) = 0. The analyst observes Y,X, and Z.
Suppose that, more general than equation (1), we would specify E(X|Z =
z)=g(z) for some function g. Typically, it is not diﬃcult to estimate g,a n d
this is why we simply redeﬁne g(z)a so u rz. This presupposes that g varies with
z. In other words, Z as a candidate instrumental variable must be informative.
Also, note that the speciﬁcation X = Z + ω with E(ω|Z) = 0 can also capture
discrete X. Notably, if X is binary, one may deﬁne X =1 ⇐⇒ X∗ > 0w i t h
X∗ = Z + ω∗ and ω∗ being uniformly distributed on the interval [−1,0]. To
facilitate the exposition we assume that Pr(Z ≥ 0,X≥ 0) = 1.
Suppose that in Period 1 the agent does not acquire his personal realization of
Z.T h e nZ only aﬀects Y by way of X,s oZ is a valid instrumental variable (IV)
because the corresponding exclusion restriction (ER) is satisﬁed. Now suppose
that in Period 1 the agent does acquire his personal realization of Z.T h e n Z
may aﬀect his value of a. In that case, from equation (2), there is a causal eﬀect
of Z on the outcome, resulting in a violation of the ER needed for instrumental
variable estimation (IVE). Before we analyze this, we ﬁrst derive in the next




An agent maximizes his expected present value. To focus on the main issue we
consider risk neutral agents. If the agent does not know his value of Z then the
expected present value R0 at the onset of Period 2 equals





EZEX|Z (W · f(X,a)) (3)
A denotes the choice set of a,w i t hA⊂[0,∞). We denote the optimal a by a0.
Now suppose that the agent knows that his value of Z is z. The expected






EX|Z=z (W · f(X,a)) (i =1 ,2) (4)
where r is the discount factor. The optimal a can be expressed as a(z).




(EZR(Z) − R0)( 5 )
It is optimal to acquire Z in Period 1 if and only if V> γ . A central issue of
the paper is under which conditions this occurs. For the moment, we simplify
the above expressions by subsuming the parameter W/(1 + r) into the function
f,a n d1+r in (5) into V .
The ﬁrst insight is that if f is additive in X and a then the optimal a(z)i n
(4) does not depend on z, and it is equal to a0. Consequently, V =0 ,a n dt h e
agent does not acquire Z.I ns u m ,
Proposition 1. If the outcome is additive in the treatment status and the eﬀort
of the agent then the exclusion restriction is satisﬁed.
Throughout the paper we consider functions f that are positive and increas-
ing. As will become clear below, the main practical distinction in the derivations
will be whether A is discrete or not. In the continuous case we often assume that
c is quadratic, with c(a)=1
2c0a2 and c0 > 0. Also, many results will be derived
for the following functional form for f,
f(x,a)=ψ0 + ψ1a + ψ2x + ρxa (6)
with suitable restrictions on ψ1,ψ 2,ψ 3,ρguaranteeing that f is positive and in-
creasing in the relevant intervals for x and a. We do however also provide results
for non-parametric speciﬁcations of f. The functional form in (6) is concise and
allows for explicit expressions and results for the quantities of interest. The
interaction parameter ρ captures the degree of complementarity (ρ>0) or sub-
stitutability (ρ<0) of treatment and eﬀort, in the outcome. The functional
form is less restrictive as may seem. First of all, with binary a and x,( 6 )i s
non-parametric because the four possible values of f (i.e., f(1,1),f(1,0),f(0,1),
and f(0,0)) are represented by ψ0,ψ 1,ψ 2, and ρ. Secondly, as will become clear
below, we may generalize the term ψ0+ψ2x at no cost to a general function k2(x)
(provided that the resulting f is positive and increasing). So all results based
on (6) generalize in this respect. The same applies if we replace ψ1a by a func-
tion k1(a), provided that k1(a) − c(a) is quadratic (and again f is positive and
increasing), where quadraticness is merely needed to ensure explicit expressions
8for the optimal a. More in general, the right-hand side of (6) can be interpreted
as the ﬁrst part of an expansion of the underlying f. It is also useful to point
out that in the related literature on decision making with a noisy signal about
the unknown state of the world, the general eﬀect of the shape of the outcome
function (f) on the value of information (V ) is typically too hard to analyze in
terms of the model primitives, if no parametric assumptions are made on f (see
Persico, 2000, and Athey and Levin, 2001). We return to this literature below.
3.2 Optimal behavior with continuous eﬀort
Suppose that the choice set A of eﬀort a is an interval. We do not restrict Z or
X to be discrete or continuous, so the results below are valid in both cases.
We start with the model in which the functions f and c satisfy (6) and the
quadratic speciﬁcation c(a)=1
2c0a2, respectively. Within this framework we ﬁrst
consider the case ρ>0. This means that treatment and eﬀort are complements
in the outcome. The requirements that f is positive and increasing are then
fulﬁlled by way of the restrictions that ψ0 > 0,ψ 1 ≥ 0,ψ 2 ≥ 0. Also, we assume
that c0 > 0. The optimal a is always positive, and we assume that the lower and
upper boundary of A are not binding for the optimal a.









Note that a(z)i n c r e a s e si nz. This was to be expected. The complementarity of
f implies that the marginal return of eﬀort is higher if the expected (beneﬁcial)
treatment level is higher. Also, the optimal eﬀort is higher if the cost of it is
lower, if the marginal return of it is higher, and if the degree of complementarity is
higher. The optimal a does not depend on the marginal eﬀect ψ2 of the treatment
X.






Consequently, the ER is violated iﬀ 1
2c0ρ2var(Z) >γ .
Before we interpret this result we ﬁrst analyze the case ρ<0. This means that
treatment and eﬀort are substitutes in the outcome. In the case of participation
9in active labor market programs, this case may be more realistic than the case
ρ>0. For example, there may be an upper bound on the outcome, and the
eﬀort has to compete with eﬀorts for other activities outside of the model.5 We
also assume again that c0 > 0. The requirement that f is positive and increasing
now leads to more complex restrictions on the parameters of f. Notably, the
parameters need to ensure that X and a are bounded from above. For a start,
we take ψ0 > 0,ψ 1 > 0,ψ 2 > 0. Next, we ensure that f increases in a for every
x in the support of X. Suﬃcient for this is that Pr(X<
ψ1
−ρ|Z = z) = 1 for
every z in the support of Z,b e c a u s et h i si m pl i e st h a tP r ( X<
ψ1
−ρ) = 1, which
implies the desired property of f.N o t e t h a t P r ( X<
ψ1
−ρ|Z = z) = 1 together
with E(X|Z = z)=z also implies that Pr(Z<
ψ1
−ρ) = 1, which in turn implies
that the optimal a is positive. Finally, we ensure that f increases in X for every
a. This is satisﬁed if a<
ψ2
−ρ. We want to have a suﬃcient condition for this
in terms of the model parameters. The optimal a decreases in z,s ot h el a r g e s t
possible value of a as a function of z is achieved at z = 0. This value equals
ψ1/c0.T h u s , f has the desired property if ψ1/c0 <ψ 2/(−ρ) or, equivalently,
ψ2c0 + ρψ1 > 0. In sum, we require
ψ0 > 0,ψ 1 > 0,ψ 2 > 0,ψ 2c0 + ρψ1 > 0, Pr(X<
ψ1
−ρ
|Z = z)=1 , (9)
where the last requirement applies for all z in the support of Z. The requirements
also imply that the optimal a satisﬁes 0 <s≤ ψ1/c0.
We again assume that the lower and upper boundary of A are not binding
for the optimal a. It is not diﬃcult to see that the expressions for the latter are
t h es a m ea s( 7 ) ,w i t ha(z) now decreasing in z. The resulting expression for V is
also the same as in (8). We thus obtain,
Proposition 2. Consider the model with continuous eﬀort, quadratic costs of ef-
fort, and the outcome function (6) with the conditions that ensure that it increases
in eﬀort and the treatment status. Then the exclusion restriction is violated iﬀ
ρ2var(Z)/(2c0) >γ .
This means, ﬁrst of all, that the ER is likely to be violated if the treatment
status and the eﬀort before the treatment strongly interact in their eﬀect on the
outcome. This is because in that case the optimal eﬀort a(z) is very responsive
5This does not rule out that the treatment and the eﬀorts after the realization of the treat-
ment are complements in their eﬀect on outcomes in subsequent time periods. These are not
in the present model but one can extend it to include them.
10to the agent’s value z, and the loss of choosing the wrong6 amount of eﬀort is
larger. For example, if ρ>0 then knowing that z is large leads to an optimal
eﬀort a(z) that is also very large, while knowing that z i ss m a l ll e a d st oas m a l l
a(z), and in both of these cases the alternative choice of an intermediate eﬀort
level a0 entails a substantial loss.
Violation is also more likely if Z has a large variance. In that case, the
candidate instrument generates a large range of mean policy intensities X|Z,
and it is more likely that not acquiring Z leads to a large loss. If the eﬀort cost
parameter c0 is large then violation is less likely, because then the optimal eﬀort
is small whether one acquires z or not. Violation of the ER is more likely if γ is
small, which is trivial to understand.
It is also useful to discuss which model parameters do not aﬀect the likelihood
that the ER is violated. First, consider the parameter ψ2 capturing the additive
treatment-eﬀect component that does not depend on eﬀort. It does not aﬀect the
value of information precisely because the additive eﬀect cannot be inﬂuenced
by the eﬀort. Until now we have not deﬁned summary treatment eﬀects yet.
However, it is clear that any such measure depends on ψ2. We conclude that the
size of the (average) treatment eﬀect does not aﬀect the validity of the ER.
Secondly, consider the strength of the candidate instrument. This is usually
deﬁned as the strength of the association between Z and X, for example as
measured by the squared correlation coeﬃcient R2(X,Z) ,w h i c hi no u rm o d e l
reduces to var(Z)/var(X). This quantity does not have a direct eﬀect on the
validity of the ER. If the residual variance var(ω) in the “treatment equation”
(1) is of a higher order of magnitude than var(Z) then the candidate instrument
is weak but it may nevertheless have a large variance by itself, and the latter
makes it likely that the ER is violated. The underlying reason is that agents
are only concerned with the mean of the treatment status X given z, when they
decide on their optimal eﬀort a.7
6In this section, “wrong” is used in the sense of “wrong if the agent had known his actual
value of Z”.
7More general functional forms of f(x,a) may have somewhat diﬀerent implications. If





If, for example, k(x)=x3 and ω ≡ X − Z is symmetric, then varZ(E(k(X)|Z)) can be shown







11Thirdly, the validity of the ER does not depend on ψ0 and ψ1. The fact that
it does not depend on any of the ψi parameters reﬂects the fact that additive
eﬀects of treatment status and eﬀort do not aﬀect the ER (recall Proposition 1).
We now return to the related literature on decision making with a noisy
signal about the state of the world. In this literature, agents receive a signal (say,
Z) about the unknown state of the world (say, X) and they have to decide on
which action (say a) to take. The outcome (say, f) depends on X and a (see
Gollier, 2001, for a recent overview of models with signals, eﬀort, and outcomes).
The main diﬀerence with our setupis that in this literature the focus is on the
strength of the causal eﬀect from the state of the world X on the signal Z (or,
equivalently, on the quality of the signal), whereas in our setup Z causally aﬀects
X. Also, this literature restricts attention to outcome functions f that satisfy
generalized notions of complementarity in the state of the world and the action
of the individual.
Nevertheless, some of the results from this literature are directly applicable
to our context. Athey and Levin (2001) present a generalized version of the
following. Consider our model with continuous eﬀort, where the treatment status
X increases in Z in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Let the outcome
function increase in eﬀort and in the treatment status, and let the cross-derivative
be positive. Then there is a monotone positive relation between z and the optimal
eﬀort a(z). If no parametric assumptions are made on f then the general eﬀect
of the shape of the outcome function (f) on the value of information (V )i s
typically too hard to analyze in terms of the model primitives (see Persico, 2000,
and Athey and Levin, 2001). Results that have been derived for given (i.e., not
optimally determined) functions a(z) emphasize the importance of the degree of
complementarity of the outcome function for the value of information. We return
to this in Subsection 4.2.
3.3 Optimal behavior with discrete eﬀort
Now let A be discrete. For expositional reasons, we simplify the analysis by
assuming that a is binary, i.e. is taken from the set {0,1}. We adopt speciﬁcation
(6) for f. The cost of eﬀort function c(a) is now represented by its two possible
values c(0) and c(1). By analogy to the previous subsection, we denote c(1)−c(0)
by c0, which may be called the cost of eﬀort. The expressions for the present values
can now be simpliﬁed to
Therefore, the value of information V increases in var(ω), and increases in the weakness of the
candidate IV as conventionally deﬁned.
12R(z)=ψ0 − c(0) + ψ2z +m a x {0,ψ 1 + ρz − c0} (10)
R0 = R(z)
and the agent chooses a = 1 iﬀ the second term in the maximum exceeds 0, so














where I(.) denotes the indicator function. The intuition behind these expressions
is exactly as for equation (7). The diﬀerence is that a(z) is now discrete instead
of continuous, and the optimal choice of a is now insensitive to small changes in
the parameter values.
To facilitate the exposition, we make the additional assumption that Z has two
possible values in the population of agents: Pr(Z = z1)=p =1− Pr(Z = z2),
with z1  = z2 and 0 <p<1 and normalization z1 >z 2. It is again useful to
distinguish between the two cases in which treatment and eﬀort are substitutes
(ρ<0) or complements (ρ>0) for the outcome. This time we start with the
former case, which requires again some restrictions on the range of values of the
model parameters. By analogy to the previous subsection, we impose




where the last requirement applies for both zi. In fact, the results below also
apply if ψ2 + ρ = 0, meaning that with eﬀort a = 1 it is irrelevant whether
the treatment is realized or not. This describes situations in which the outcome
of interest is the transition from unemployment to work if this is achieved with
certainty by the eﬀort a = 1 but the treatment by itself cannot achieve this.
With ρ<0, equation (11) implies that
0 ≤ a(z1) ≤ a0 ≤ a(z2) ≤ 1
and we can distinguish between the following four “regimes”,
• Regime 1. ψ1 + ρz1 >c 0.T h e na(z1)=a0 = a(z2)=1 .
13• Regime 2. ψ1 + ρz1 ≤ c0 <ψ 1 + ρz.T h e n0=a(z1) <a 0 = a(z2)=1 .
• Regime 3. ψ1 + ρz ≤ c0 <ψ 1 + ρz2.T h e n0=a(z1)=a0 <a (z2)=1 .
• Regime 4. ψ1 + ρz2 ≤ c0.T h e n0=a(z1)=a0 = a(z2).
Next, we consider V .I nR e g i m e1 ,V = 0, implying that the information is
not bought. This is because the agent knows that he will always provide eﬀort,
under every policy, whether the policy is known or not, so the information is
irrelevant for the optimal behavior. The same line of reasoning applies to Regime
4. So, for certain extreme parameter values, the agent does not acquire his value
of Z. Now consider Regimes 2 and 3. We obtain that in Regime 2,
V = p(c0 − ψ1 − ρz1)
(recall that p := Pr(Z = z1)). This result is particularly easy to interpret. In
Regime 2, the information on Z is valuable if and only if in truth the agent
has policy intensity z1, because he does provide eﬀort if he has no information.
Therefore the value V equals minus the expected loss of making such a wrong
decision. More precisely, V equals the product of [ the probability that, when
Z is not acquired, an eﬀort a0 is chosen that is not optimal in the light of the
actual Z ] and [ minus the loss of choosing a0 given that the actual Z would lead
to another choice of a ]. In Regime 2, the statement in the ﬁrst square brackets
equals Pr(Z = z1), which is p. The statement in the second set of square brackets
equals [ the additional cost c0 of choosing a0 = 1 compared to the costs made if
one had known that Z = z1 ] minus [ the additional expected return of choosing
a0 = 1 compared to the expected return if one had known that Z = z1 ]. Similarly,
in Regime 3,
V =( 1− p)(ψ1 + ρz2 − c0)
V> 0 if and only if the optimal eﬀort when knowing that Z = z1 diﬀers from the
optimal eﬀort when knowing that Z = z2. This is intuitively clear: only in these
c a s e sd o e st h ek n o w l e d g eo fZ potentially have an eﬀect on the eﬀort provided.
The results for the case ρ>0 are a mirror image of those for ρ<0. The op-
timal eﬀorts satisfy 0 ≤ a(z2) ≤ a(z) ≤ a(z1) ≤ 1, and these can be characterized
in terms of the model parameters by applying equation (11). For sake of brevity
we do not present the other results for this case.
Consider Figure 1, plotting V against c0 for the case ρ<0. The maximum
of V as a function of c0 is attained at the boundary between Regimes 2 and 3,
which means c0 = ψ1 + ρz. This value Vmax equals
14Vmax = |ρ|p(1 − p)(z1 − z2)
which also holds if ρ ≥ 0. Vmax >γiﬀ there are values c(1),c(0) of the cost-of-
eﬀort function for which it is optimal to buy the information. The expression for
Vmax is similar to the expression (8) for V in the continuous case. In particular,
note that var(Z)=p(1−p)(z1−z2)2. The comparative statics results concerning
the eﬀects of ρ,γ and var(Z) for the continuous case therefore carry over to
the present discrete case. For example, concerning p we ﬁnd that acquisition is
more likely if p is not too large and not too small, because p =1 /2 maximizes the
variance of Z in the population, for given values of z1,z 2. The a priori uncertainty
concerning which value of Z applies is largest for such intermediate values of p,
and so is therefore the a priori probability of providing the wrong amount of
eﬀort.
What is particular about the discrete case is that for certain parameter values
(namely in Regimes 1 and 4) the optimal a does not depend on Z. Due to the
continuity of the value functions, the ensuing low value of information also applies
for parameter values such that the agent is in one of the other regimes but close
to Regimes 1 and 4. In those cases the loss of making a wrong decision on a is too
small to justify the acquisition of one’s value of Z. Consequently, it is important
15to assess which parameter values lead to Regimes 1 or 4. Notably, the agent is
more likely to be in one of the latter regimes if c0 is very large or very small.
The underlying explanation is that for such high or low values of c0, acquiring
information on Z would never lead to behavioral changes. Similarly, if ψ1 is very
l a r g ew h i l et h eo t h e rpa r a m e t e r sh a v em o d e r a t ev a l u e st h e ne ﬀ o r th a ss u c ha
positive eﬀect on the outcome that the agent always provides eﬀort a =1 .
We may re-interpret the eﬀects of the costs parameters c0 and γ in terms
of marginal utility losses for a risk-averse agent who cannot transfer resources
between time periods and who has a per-period utility function that displays
decreasing absolute risk aversion. If the agent has a low per-period baseline
income then the marginal utility losses of costs c0 in Period 2 and γ in Period
1 are relatively high. The acquisition of information is unlikely for two reasons:
it is expensive and it is useless because it would not aﬀect optimal eﬀort. This
makes violation of the exclusion restriction unlikely. If the agent has a very high
per-period baseline income then the marginal utility loss of costs c0 in Period
2 is small, and acquisition is again unlikely, but now only for the second of the
above two reasons.8 Again, the exclusion restriction is then relatively easy to
justify. For agents with per-period baseline incomes in between these extremes it
is more likely that information on Z is acquired, so then the exclusion restriction
is more easily violated. From this point of view, instrumental variable analyses
that restrict attention to agents with low or high resources (e.g. income) are more
likely to be valid than analyses that include agents with intermediate resource
levels, if eﬀort is binary.
One may combine the discrete case of this subsection with the continuous
case of the previous subsection, e.g. by allowing the eﬀort a to attain all values
in a ﬁxed interval, e.g. [0,1], with bounds that are binding for certain model
parameter values. Suﬃciently large parameter value changes then typically lead
to results that correspond to those in this subsection. An alternative theoretical
extension would be to allow agents to manipulate the probability distribution of
their treatment status X by way of their choice of a. In Appendix 1 we show
how this can be translated into our model framework.
We now return to the leading example, where the treatment is participation
in a job search assistance program for unemployed individuals, and the policy
intensity diﬀers across regions. An unemployed individual knows that there is a
8Unless of course the expected marginal return of providing eﬀort is always very small as
well. The problem with characterizing comparative statics eﬀects on optimal behavior if the
latter is a highly non-linear function of a large number of parameters is that there are often
joint limiting values of a subset of parameters that “push” the result in any desired direction.
16chance that he may enroll in a job search assistance program, and this may aﬀect
his job search strategy before actual enrollment. If the program is attractive and if
the applicable regional probability of enrollment into the program is known, then
this probability may aﬀect the optimal private job search eﬀort before enrollment
into the program. With a negative interaction eﬀect of treatment and eﬀort on the
outcome of being employed within a year, the eﬀort is lower if the probability of
enrollment is higher. We now apply the results in order to inquire the conditions
under which Z is a valid instrumental variable, that is, the conditions under
which the agent does not acquire his value of Z. First, it may be relatively easy
for agents to learn the speciﬁc situation in their own region and the eﬀect of this
on the rate at which they expect to be treated. This should lead to caution when
using regional variation in the budget for (or, more generally, an indicator of
the geographical availability of) active labor market programs as an instrumental
variable to study causal eﬀects of the program. The agents’ incentive to acquire
information is particularly high if treatment and eﬀort are close substitutes in
the outcome, or if the policy intensity varies strongly across the regions, or if the
agents take the a priori probability of whether one lives in the high-budget region
to be equal to around 1/2 which means that about half of the agents are exposed
to the high-budget situation.
Note that the case where Z and Y are binary is equivalent to a randomized
experiment with deliberate randomization. Typically, in experiments, the inten-
tion to treat is randomized with probability equal to 1/2. Our results suggest
that (provided that the individual randomization outcome can only be acquired
at a positive cost when one has to decide the eﬀort level a) it may be better to
use a smaller or larger probability, because this reduces the likelihood that the
agent has an incentive to acquire and use the value of the candidate instrumental
variable.
So far we have only examined a single candidate instrumental variable. Clearly,
if there are many such variables, each giving only limited information on the treat-
ment assignment process, and if the cost of information acquisition is linear in
the number of variables on which information is acquired, then this reduces the
likelihood that the exclusion restriction is violated. Other obvious results concern
the timing of events (i.e., the relative lengths of the time periods in the model).
For example, with a small amount of time between the moment at which the pol-
icy intensity is determined and the moment at which the treatment is realized,
the scope for information acquisition is reduced. If treatment and outcome are
realized close in time then acquisition is attractive from the point of view that
its expected future returns are discounted less heavily.
174 The magnitude of the bias of the instrumental
variable estimator if the exclusion restriction
is violated
4.1 The parameter of interest and the estimator
In this section we address the bias of the instrumental variable estimator due
to the exclusion restriction violations that we consider. It is useful to return
to the “reduced form” model representation from Section 2. IVE involves the
estimation of the eﬀect of X on Y , holding all other determinants of Y constant.
In the model, this is the partial derivative or ﬁrst diﬀerence of f with respect to
its ﬁrst argument. The classical IV regression estimator, if applied to data on
Y,X, and Z, estimates cov(Y,Z)/cov(X,Z). More precisely, estimation involves
that these two covariances are replaced by their sample equivalents, and then the








We simply deﬁne this to be the parameter of interest β. It is a summary measure
of the slope of the average outcome as a function of treatment status for a given
ﬁxed eﬀort. The focus on β is particularly sensible if f is linear in X,a si st h e
case in speciﬁcation (6), because then this slope is constant and equal to β.9
9For more general f one may consider alternative parameters of interest. First, f as a
function of x may be estimated non-parametrically. If X and Z are continuous then f can
be approximated by a power series and estimated with series estimation using instruments
Z,Z2,Z3... (see Blundell and Powell, 2003, for an overview). Secondly, one may focus on the
average derivative AD := E(
∂f
∂x(X,a0)) as parameter of interest. In both cases the estimates
are biased if the actual eﬀort a depends on Z. However, formal insightful analyses of the bias
for general f are hampered by complexity of the expressions involved.
In fact, under certain conditions, β = AD. Notably, if a general function f(x,a0)a sa
function of x can be represented by a power series, then β = AD if (a) the second and higher
order coeﬃcients are all zero, or if (b) the third and higher order coeﬃcients are all zero and Z
is symmetrically distributed, or if (c) Z is normally distributed (which however is formally ruled
out by Pr(Z ≥ 0) = 1). For general f, application of Stein’s Lemma provides a justiﬁcation
for β as an approximation of the average derivative. Notably, for two random variables U1,U 2
and a function g, this Lemma states that cov(g(U1),U 2) ≈ E(g (U1))cov(U1,U 2), so application
18Moreover, as we shall see, β is a local average treatment eﬀect if Z is discrete
with two points of support. Note that we assume population homogeneity of all
model parameters, functions, and distributions.10
Throughout the upcoming subsections we assume that the function f gov-
erning the observed outcomes is the same as the function f that agents use in
Periods 1 and 2 to assess their expected utility in Period 3. This entails that
agents know the average treatment eﬀect that the researcher aims to estimate.
In Subsection 4.5 we relax this assumption and show how the results change.
Expression (12) can be simpliﬁed by noting that cov(X,Z) equals var(Z).














Note that  βIV captures the over-all eﬀect of Z on the outcome. If the ER is
violated then the over-all eﬀect does not equal the causal treatment eﬀect but
also includes the causal chain that runs by way of the eﬀort a.F r o me q u a t i o n s
(13) and (14) it follows that




Somewhat loosely, this is an average of the eﬀect on the outcome of the de-
pendence of a on Z.11 If treatment and eﬀort are complements in the outcome
then one may expect that the optimal eﬀort is an increasing function of z,a n d
leads to β ≈ E(
∂f
∂x(X,a0)).
10Any meaningfully deﬁned treatment eﬀect will depend on eﬀort a0 which will in general
depend on properties of the distribution of Z like E(Z) (note that this concerns situations in
which the ER is satisﬁed). In empirical studies, such an association between the treatment
eﬀect and the degree at which a population is exposed to a policy can be mistakenly attributed
to equilibrium eﬀects of the policy.
11This is again more transparent for approximations of the asymptotic bias. Application of
Stein’s Lemma (see footnote 9) leads to  βIV −β ≈ EZ( d
dzE(f(X,a(Z))−f(X,a0)|Z)). Applica-
tion of the Delta method approximation (which, for a random variable U and a function g, states
that cov(g(U),U) ≈ g (E(U))var(U)) leads to  βIV − β ≈ d
dzE(f(X,a(z)) − f(X,a0)|z)|z=z.I t
can be shown that if z is a location parameter of the distribution of [X|Z = z]a n di fa(z)=a0
and a(z) is diﬀerentiable then this simpliﬁes further to
19consequently one may expect the asymptotic bias to be positive. In the next
subsections we examine this more formally.
If Z describes the assigned treatment (as opposed to the actual treatment X)
then the over-all eﬀect is usually called the intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀect on the
outcome. This can be decomposed into the actual treatment eﬀect β and the
announcement or ex ante eﬀect of the treatment (see e.g. Abbring and Van den
Berg, 2003, 2005, for this terminology). The latter thus equals  βIV −β,w h i c hi s
the asymptotic bias of the IV estimator  βIV of β.
From an econometric regression point of view, one may state that the asymp-
totic bias of the IV estimator results from the fact that the size of the causal
eﬀect of treatment on outcome depends on the candidate IV. An alternative
way to look at the asymptotic bias is to write the outcome equation as Y =
f(X,a0)+( f(X,a(Z)) − f(X,a0)) + ε. By ignoring the dependence of a on Z,
an IV regression analysis takes the sum of the second and third terms in the
right-hand side as the residual term in the outcome equation. Consequently, the
candidate IV Z is correlated to the error term in the outcome equation.
Note that instrumental variable estimators are typically biased in case of
ER violations even if the residual terms ε and ω in the outcome and treatment
equations are independent, i.e. even if the treatment is not selective in the usual
sense of the word.
4.2 Continuous eﬀort
Suppose that the ER is violated. We are ﬁrst going to examine the asymptotic
bias in the model with continuous eﬀort, quadratic costs of eﬀort, and the outcome
function (6), with the conditions that ensure that it increases in eﬀort and the
treatment status. Subsequently we generalize the cost-of-eﬀort function and the
outcome function.
With the outcome function (6), β as deﬁned above is the average treatment
eﬀect in the population ∂f(x,a)/∂x which in this speciﬁc case does not depend on
x, and which is evaluated at a = a0. By substituting f into (13), and substituting
a0, we obtain,






where ω = X − Z (see equation (1)). Clearly, a (z) captures the responsiveness of eﬀort to
the value of Z, and the second term in the right hand side captures the eﬀect of eﬀort on the
outcome. We return in the next subsection to the quality of these approximations in special
cases.




which is always positive, by virtue of the conditions ensuring that f is increasing.
Similarly, by substituting (6) and a(z) from (7) into (14), we obtain,



















In Appendix 2 we prove the following:
Proposition 3. Consider the model with continuous eﬀort, quadratic costs of
eﬀort, and the outcome function (6) with the conditions that ensure that it in-
creases in eﬀort and the treatment status. If the exclusion restriction is violated
then the asymptotic bias of the IV estimator  βIV has the same sign as ρ.
This result reinforces earlier results on the importance of the interaction param-
eter. For ρ>0 the result is very intuitive. In that case, if the agent acquires his
value z of Z, then eﬀort is increasing in z; the estimated treatment eﬀect is then
boosted, and the causal eﬀect of the treatment is over-estimated, so asymptoti-
cally  βIV >β . In Appendix 2 we demonstrate that if ρ>0t h e n βIV and  βIV −β
increase in ρ.I f ρ increases then it is optimal to make the eﬀort a(z)m o r er e -
sponsive to z, so that the announcement eﬀect and therefore the asymptotic bias
increase. For ρ<0 the additive and the interaction eﬀects of a(z)h a v eo ppo s i t e
signs, but the former dominates. Note also that the asymptotic bias decreases in
c0. If costs of eﬀort are low then it is pays oﬀ to supply a large amount of eﬀort
for certain z, thus making eﬀort more responsive to z.
In Appendix 2 we also demonstrate that (18) can be rewritten as








and σ := κ
1
2
2/z,w i t hκi := E(Z − z)i. From this equation some additional
comparative statics results follow. As β does not depend on moments of Z higher
than the ﬁrst, it follows that  βIV and  βIV − β increase in the skewness ξ of Z.
This makes sense: e.g. if Z is highly skewed to the right then relatively many
21agents have a very high treatment value and a very high eﬀort level, leading to a
very high correlation between outcome and candidate instrument.
Notice that if Z is symmetric (i.e. ξ = 0) then the variance of Z does not aﬀect
the asymptotic bias of  βIV. In this case, increasing var(Z) leads to an increasing
value of information, and therefore an increasing likelihood of ER violation, but
not to an increasing asymptotic bias of the IV estimator.12 So in this sense the
asymptotic bias is even less sensitive to the strength of the candidate instrument
than the ER.
Equation (19) can also be used to bound β further. We consider using the
sign of the skewness of Z, which is always observable. In particular, in case of
a balanced experiment, ξ = 0. We also consider cases where one has a priori
knowledge on the sign of ρ and on whether the additive eﬀect ψ2 of treatment on
outcome is zero or positive.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Proposition 3,
(i). If Z is symmetric or skewed to the left then, asymptotically, β ≥ 1
2
 βIV.
(ii). If Z is symmetric and ψ2 =0then, asymptotically, β = 1
2
 βIV.
(iii). If Z is skewed to the right and ψ2 =0then, asymptotically, β<1
2
 βIV.
(iv). If Z is symmetric or skewed to the left and ρ>0 then, asymptotically,
1
2
 βIV ≤ β< βIV.
Extension to other cases is straightforward. Notice that ψ2 = 0 implies that
ρ>0.13
We now consider more general models. First, if we replace the additive term
ψ0+ψ2x in the outcome function by a general function k2(x) then all asymptotic
12With our outcome and cost functions, the case ξ = 0 is also the case for which the asymp-
totic bias approximations by Stein’s Lemma and the Delta method, in footnote 11, are exact.
13Comparison of the performance of the IV estimator to that of the OLS estimator is not
very informative, as the latter is also driven by the covariance of the residual terms ε and ω
whereas the former is not. It can be shown that asymptotically,
 βOLS =  βIV · R2(X,Z)+β · (1 − R2(X,Z)) +
cov(ε,ω)
var(X)
which holds regardless of whether the ER is satisﬁed or not (in the former case, of course,
 βIV = β). It follows that IV does better than OLS if the IV bias due to violation of the ER is
small and the “selection eﬀect” as measured by cov(ε,ω) is large. In absence of such a selection
eﬀect, OLS does better than IV if the ER is violated and R2(X,Z) < 1. With randomized
experiments, X ≡ Z and ε⊥ ⊥ω,s o βOLS =  βIV.
22bias results remain valid. Next, we relax the assumption that costs of eﬀort are
quadratic.
Proposition 4. Consider the model with continuous eﬀort and the outcome func-
tion (6) with ψ0 > 0,ψ 1,ψ 2 ≥ 0, and ρ>0. Let the cost of eﬀort be increasing,
convex, and diﬀerentiable and lead to an interior solution for the optimal eﬀort.
If the exclusion restriction is violated then the asymptotic bias of the IV estimator
 βIV is positive.
See Appendix 3 for the proof.
It is more diﬃcult to extend the result to the case where treatment and eﬀort
are substitutes in the outcome (i.e., ρ<0 ) . T h i si sb e c a u s ew i t hρ<0t h e
additive treatment eﬀect and the interaction eﬀect of treatment and eﬀort have
opposite signs.14
Next, we relax the assumption that f satisﬁes (6), so we do not make any
parametric assumptions on the cost function and the outcome function. We use
the monotonicity result of Athey and Levin (2001) (see Subsection 3.2) as an
input. As noted above, in the literature on decision making with signals on
the unknown state of the world, comparative statics are sometimes too hard
to analyze in terms of the model primitives, and one can only derive results
for given (i.e., not optimally determined) eﬀort functions. To a certain extent
our next result shares this feature, in that we assume that the optimal eﬀort
function a(z)s a t i s ﬁ e sa(z)=a0 without translating this into model primitives.
The assumption means that the agent’s optimal eﬀort if he knows that he has
the average treatment intensity is equal to the agent’s optimal eﬀort if he does
not know his intensity. In the cases considered in the previous propositions, this
assumption actually follows from the assumptions on the model primitives.
Proposition 5. Let the outcome function f(x,a) be non-negative, increasing and
supermodular in x and a. Let the treatment status X increase in Z in the sense
14See e.g. equation (33) in Appendix 3. Speciﬁcally, with less parametric assumptions, it
is cumbersome to formulate and exploit restrictions ensuring that the outcome increases in
treatment and eﬀort everywhere if treatment and eﬀort are substitutes. However, using the
Delta method approximation (see footnote 11) the desired result follows. We substitute the
result from Appendix 3 that a(z)=a0 into the approximation, to obtain:
 βIV − β ≈ (ψ1 + ρz)a (z)
With ρ<0, the function a(z) is decreasing (see Appendix 3), and the requirement that f
is increasing implies that z<ψ 1/(−ρ). The right-hand side of the above approximation is
therefore negative.
23of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Let the optimal eﬀort function a(z) satisfy
a(z)=a0. If the exclusion restriction is violated then the asymptotic bias of the
IV estimator  βIV is non-negative.
See Appendix 4 for the proof. Supermodularity captures complementarity and is
satisﬁed if the cross-derivative of f(x,a) with respect to x and a is positive. The
assumption that X increases in Z in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
is not nested with the assumption that E(X|Z = z)=z, although the former is
weaker as a condition for E(X|Z = z)t oi n c r e a s ei nz.
Note that Proposition 5 does not require continuity of eﬀort a. In the next
subsection we consider the discrete case in more detail.
4.3Discrete eﬀort
Let a be binary and let Z have a discrete distribution with points of support




which is a local average treatment eﬀect (compare Imbens and Angrist, 1994;
note that the denominator equals E(X|z1) − E(X|z2)). If the ER is valid then
t h eI Ve s t i m a t o r βIV converges to this number. Accordingly, a Wald estimator
can be used as IV estimator.





so that again  βIV captures the over-all eﬀect of Z on the outcome.
We proceed by taking the outcome function f to satisfy (6). From the above
(as well as from the previous subsection) it immediately follows that β = ψ2+ρa0.
If the ER is violated then necessarily a(z1)  = a(z2). With ρ<0, violation implies
that 0 = a(z1) <a (z2) = 1, whereas with ρ>0 this is reversed. By elaborating
on equation (14) or on equation (20), we obtain








Depending on the sign of ρ and the value of a0, we have four diﬀerent expressions
for the asymptotic bias,
24 βIV − β →−
ψ1 + ρz2
z1 − z2
if ρ<0a n da0 =0
 βIV − β →−
ψ1 + ρz1
z1 − z2
if ρ<0a n da0 =1
 βIV − β →
ψ1 + ρz1
z1 − z2
if ρ>0a n da0 =0
 βIV − β →
ψ1 + ρz2
z1 − z2
if ρ>0a n da0 =1
We thus obtain,
Proposition 6. Consider the model with binaryeﬀort, a candidate IV with a
discrete distribution with two points of support, and the outcome function (6) with
the conditions that ensure that it increases in eﬀort and the treatment status. If
the exclusion restriction is violated then the asymptotic bias of the IV estimator
 βIV has the same sign as ρ.
which is very similar to Proposition 3 of the previous subsection. The intuition
is the same.
The bias terms listed above increase in absolute value if z1 − z2 decreases.
However, recall that the expressions are derived under the assumption that the
ER is violated. For ﬁxed values of the other parameters, the ER is satisﬁed for
suﬃciently small values of z1 − z2.
4.4 Testing for a causal treatment eﬀect in absence of an
exclusion restriction
Despite the fact that the IV estimator is asymptotically biased if the ER is vi-
olated, we can still use standard tests to inquire whether the treatment has a
causal eﬀect on the outcome. To see this, notice that in absence of a treatment
eﬀect the value of information is zero, so there is no acquisition of information,
implying that the ER is satisﬁed and the IV treatment eﬀect estimator is asymp-
totically equal to zero. The standard asymptotic tests of the null hypothesis of
a zero treatment eﬀect therefore have the correct size. This exploits the insight
that in our model any violation of the ER is behaviorally triggered by a non-zero
treatment eﬀect.
One may wonder what the power is of such tests if the null hypothesis of
no treatment eﬀect is incorrect in reality and, in addition, the ER is violated.
We shed some light on this by examining the (asymptotic) signs of β,  βIV,a n d
25 βIV −β. According to expression (13), the treatment eﬀect parameter β has the
same sign as cov(E(f(X,a0)|Z),Z). If the treatment status X increases in Z in
the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, and f(x,a) strictly increases in x,
then E(f(X,a0)|Z)i n c r e a s e si nZ, and consequently β>0.
To proceed, it matters again whether treatment and eﬀort are complements or
substitutes in the outcome. For the former case we saw earlier in this section that
asymptotically  βIV ≥ β. Therefore one may expect a higher power of the standard
asymptotic tests of the null hypothesis of a zero treatment eﬀect, compared to
when the ER is not violated. This makes sense: the true treatment eﬀect is
magniﬁed by the agents’ eﬀorts.
For the substitution case with our parametric functional forms of f(x,a)a n d
c(a), we saw that asymptotically  βIV <β . The next example shows that it is
even possible that asymptotically  βIV =0 .
Example 1. Let ψ1 = ψ2 = c0 =1a n dρ = −3/4. Note that these values
satisfy the parameter restriction ψ2c0 + ρψ1 > 0 (see (9)). In turn, they imply
that Pr(Z<4/3) = 1. By substituting our f and a(z) into (14) we obtain that
asymptotically  βIV ≥ 0i ﬀc o v ( Z,−1
2Z + 9
16Z2) ≥ 0. The function −1
2Z + 9
16Z2
strictly decreases in Z on the interval (0, 4
9), so if this interval includes the sup-
port of Z then asymptotically  βIV < 0. If Z has a discrete distribution with as
only two points of support 1/3a n d5 /9t h e n βIV → 0.
In this pathological case the asymptotic power is zero. In general, in the substi-
tution case, one may expect the power to be lower if the ER is violated than if
the ER is satisﬁed.
One way to improve the power is to look for evidence of higher-order depen-
dencies between the candidate instrument Z and the outcome Y . Under the null
hypothesis, these must be absent as well.
4.5 Systematic diﬀerence between the outcome and the
agent’s utility in the outcome period
We now allow the function f∗ governing the observed outcomes to diﬀer from the
function f that agents use in Periods 1 and 2 to evaluate their expected utility
in Period 3. This is relevant in a number of cases. The function f∗ may not take
account of side-eﬀects that make the treatment unattractive to the agent. Also,
agents may not know the value of the average treatment eﬀect that the researcher
aims to estimate, and the assumptions they make about this in Periods 1 and 2
26may be deviate systematically from the actual f∗.
The analysis in Section 3 describes how the choice of the eﬀort level a and
the validity of the ER depend on f. These decisions do not depend on f∗,s oa l l
results from that section also apply to the current framework.
To proceed, we start assuming that f satisﬁes (6), that eﬀort is continuous,










The case ψ2 <ψ ∗
2 is particularly interesting as it captures situations where the
agent perceives a disutility of the treatment that is not revealed in the outcome.
Also, with ρ<ρ ∗ < 0, the agent dislikes the combination of high treatment and
high eﬀort more than is warranted by the corresponding actual outcome.
Equations (16) and (17), expressing the parameter of interest β and the prob-























In Appendix 5 we prove the following extension of Proposition 3,
Proposition 7. Consider the model with continuous eﬀort, quadratic costs of
eﬀort, the agents’ outcome utilityfunction (6) with the conditions that ensure
that it increases in eﬀort and the treatment status, and the outcome function
(21) with the conditions that (i) if ρ∗ ≥ 0 then ψ∗
1 ≥ 0,a n d(ii) if ρ∗ < 0 then
ψ∗
1 > 0 and Pr(Z<−ψ∗
1/ρ∗)=1 . If the exclusion restriction is violated then the
asymptotic bias of the IV estimator  βIV has the same sign as ρ, with the single
exception that if ρ∗ = ψ∗
1 =0then this bias is zero.
The conditions (i)a n d( ii) on the range of ψ∗
1 and the support of Z serve to
ensure that f∗(x,a)i si n c r e a s i n gi na. This implies that we assume that both
f and f∗ are increasing in a. This is less restrictive as may seem. First, any
disutility of a can to some extent be accommodated for by the cost function c(a)
in Period 2. Secondly, we do not assume that the actual average treatment eﬀect
has the same sign as the perceived expected treatment eﬀect, since we do not
make assumptions on (the sign of) ψ∗
2,ρ ∗, and ψ∗
0.
Proposition 7 implies that of the two interaction parameters, it is the inter-
action in the agent’s objective function that drives the asymptotic bias. The
27underlying reason is that the sign of this interaction determines whether the
agent’s eﬀort is increasing or decreasing in z. If it is increasing then this boosts
the estimated average treatment eﬀect regardless of how the actual outcomes
generated. Notice also that the asymptotic bias is completely independent of the
actual and the perceived additive treatment eﬀect parameters ψ∗
2 and ψ2 and of
the strength of the candidate instrument. The other propositions of Subsections
4.2 and 4.3 can be generalized accordingly.
It is sometimes plausible that the agent can have access to more information
on the determinants of the treatment assignment process than the analyst can
observe. As this is somewhat related to the topic of this subsection, we brieﬂy
discuss its main implications for the asymptotic bias here, using a simple frame-
work where the assignment process can be captured by the following “treatment
equation”
X = Z1 + Z2 + ω (24)
with E(ω|Z)=0a n da l s oE(ε|Z) = 0, where Z := (Z1,Z 2). The analyst observes
Y,X, and Z2, but not Z1. The agent is able to acquire his values of Z1 and of
Z2. We adopt the usual functional forms for f(x,a)a n dc(a) and we assume that
Z1⊥ ⊥Z2. Moreover, we deﬁne Z1 and Z2 such that E(Z1)=0 ,s oE(X|Z2 = z2)=
z2. Notice that the parameter of interest β is now deﬁned using Z2, as follows:
β := cov(f(X,a0),Z 2)/cov(X,Z2).
We can distinguish between four cases, depending on which Zi are acquired
by the agent. Firstly, suppose the ER applies to both Z1 and Z2. Then either
(or both) can be used as instrumental variables. Secondly, suppose the ER only
applies to Z1.T h e nZ1 is a valid instrument but it is unobserved to the analyst,
so it cannot be used for inference. In this case, Z1 can be subsumed into ω,w h i c h
leads to the main model framework of this paper. Thirdly, suppose the ER only
applies to Z2.T h e nZ2 can be used for IV estimation.
Fourthly, and most interestingly, suppose the ER is violated for both Z1 and
Z2. By analogy to Subsection 4.1, we can rewrite β as ψ2 + ρa0,w h e r ea0 =
(ψ1+ρz2)/c0. The IV estimator  βIV converges to cov(f(X,a(Z)),Z 2)/cov(X,Z2),
where a(z)=( ψ1 + ρ(z1 + z2))/c0. This can be shown to lead to exactly the
same expression for  βIV as (17) in Subsection 4.2, with Z2 now replacing Z.
Consequently, the results of the previous subsections all apply here. In sum,
the results of the paper are robust with respect to whether the agent has more
information on the treatment assignment process than the analyst. Note that the
maintained assumption that the private information is orthogonal to the shared
information (i.e. Z1⊥ ⊥Z2)i sc r u c i a l .
284.6 Changing the variance of the candidate instrument or
the randomization probability
By deﬁnition, it is diﬃcult to empirically test the predictions of the paper, because
exclusion restrictions are untestable. As an alternative approach, one may look for
exogenous variation in the model parameters that aﬀect the value of information.
For a certain range of parameter values the ER is satisﬁed, whereas for another
range it is not. With suﬃcient variation of these parameters in the data, it can be
veriﬁed whether the estimated treatment eﬀect behaves as predicted as a function
of the parameter. Note that this does not involve a comparison between diﬀerent
values of a candidate IV. Rather, the comparison is at a deeper level, namely
between diﬀerent evaluation settings.
In fact, of all the determinants of V in the continuous case of Subsection 3.2,
only the variance of Z is more or less directly observable. We therefore compare
settings with diﬀerent distributions of the candidate IV, notably with diﬀerent
variances. To proceed, let eﬀort be continuous, and let Z have a distribution
with separate parameters capturing the mean z and the variance σ2
z. The data
should now include settings with diﬀerent values of σ2
z.
From the results in Subsection 3.2 it follows that the ER is satisﬁed iﬀ σ2
z <
2c0γ/ρ2. For these (smaller) values of σ2
z, the IV estimator  βIV estimates the
policy eﬀect parameter β. This parameter depends on z but not on σ2
z or any
other feature of the distribution of Z. For the values of σ2
z larger than 2c0γ/ρ2,
t h eE Ri sv i o l a t e d ,a n d βIV estimates a number diﬀerent from β, where the sign
of the diﬀerence is determined by ρ. In general, this number varies itself with σ2
z.
Moreover,  βIV as a function of σ2
z is discontinuous at 2c0γ/ρ2.
In sum, the model predicts that as σ2
z increases, there is a point at which
 βIV makes a discontinuous jump. This can be veriﬁed empirically. To the left of
the discontinuity point,  βIV is constant, but this depends crucially on the usual
functional forms for f(x,a)a n dc(a). If one has a priori knowledge on the sign
of the interaction of x and a in f(x,a) then one can verify empirically whether
the jump has the same sign. In practice, the veriﬁcation of these predictions may
be complicated by heterogeneity of agents in terms of other parameters (notably
ρ,c0 and γ) within and between evaluation settings with diﬀerent σ2
z.
Now let us specialize the above setting by assuming that Z ≡ X is binary,
with p := Pr(Z = 1). This captures experiments in which participants can
only observe their treatment status at a cost. The parameter p is then the
randomization probability or treatment assignment probability. This is the only
parameter of the distribution of Z, so it is not possible to vary var(Z) while
29keeping z constant. Speciﬁcally, var(Z)=p(1−p) while E(Z)=p. We therefore
compare settings with diﬀerent values of p which is directly observable.
The variance of Z is largest if p =1 /2. It follows that violation of the
ER is most likely at values of p around 1/2. Speciﬁcally, the ER is satisﬁed
iﬀ p(1 − p) ≤ 2c0γ/ρ2, implying that if ρ2 < 8c0γ then the ER is satisﬁed for
all parameter values, whereas if ρ2 ≥ 8c0γ then the ER is violated if p is in a
symmetric non-empty interval around p =1 /2. The latter interval is strictly
embedded in (0,1).
We ﬁrst examine situations in which the ER is satisﬁed. Then the IV estimator
 βIV estimates the policy eﬀect parameter β, which equals
β = ψ2 + ρ
ψ1 + ρp
c0
This parameter depends on p, meaning that the average treatment eﬀect diﬀers
across experiments with diﬀerent randomization probabilities, even if the ER is
satisﬁed, like in a medical double-blind experiment. It is interesting to examine
this in some detail. If p is high then the agents know that it is likely that they
have been assigned to the treatment group. With ρ>0( ρ<0), the marginal
expected return of eﬀort is higher (lower) if the expected treatment rate is higher,
so agents then have an incentive to provide more (less) eﬀort a0. For either sign
of ρ, this boosts the treatment eﬀect. For example, if p is large in a model with
ρ<0 (this could be labelled a moral hazard model), the outcome for non-treated
agents is very low because all agents do not provide much eﬀort, whereas the
outcome for treated agents is high because of the treatment. If all agents would
have provided sub-optimal medium eﬀort then the outcome for treated agents
would still be high, but the outcome for non-treated agents would be higher than
before, resulting in a lower treatment eﬀect. In sum, β increases in p for all
parameter values.
We can relate these predictions to empirical ﬁndings from randomized exper-
iments of the same medication with diﬀerent randomization probabilities, and to
empirical studies of randomized experiments in which participants were deliber-
ately deceived about the randomization probability. This requires of course that
the experiments are stretched over a suﬃciently long time span for agents to be
able to adjust their behavior in a way that aﬀects the outcome. Also, the ER
needs to be satisﬁed, so the time span should not be so long that agents can
easily detect their treatment status.
Malani (2006) provides convincing evidence that the estimated treatment ef-
fect in blinded medical trials of ulcer medications and cholesterol medications
increases with the announced treatment eﬀect, and he attributes this result to
30placebo eﬀects. In our framework this can be explained by agents rationally
adjusting their eﬀorts in response to the probability of being assigned to the
treatment group. The trials of ulcer medications (H2 blockers and proton-pump
inhibitors) and cholesterol medications (statins) examined in Malani (2006) often
last at least several weeks, and it is not inconceivable that agents change their
lifestyle during the experiment in response to the randomization probability. For
example, the treatment may be more eﬀective if the agent simultaneously im-
proves his lifestyle, and the agent will only do so if he is likely to be treated. This
assumes ρ>0, but one may also think of explanations based on ρ<0. In fact,
Malani (2006) also shows that in general the average outcome among treated
increases stronger with p than the average outcome among controls, which is
consistent with ρ>0.
Penick and Hinkle (1964) conduct two types of experimental trials of an
appetite-depressing drug (phenmetrazine). In all cases, p =1 /2. However, in
the ﬁrst trial type the agents are deceived, by, in eﬀect, informing them that
p = 0, whereas in the second type they are not deceived. Each trial type consists
of about 25 daily events spread out over several months; on each of these days
the participant receives the drug or placebo shortly before a standardized evening
meal is served. The outcome is the amount of food not consumed at that meal.
The estimated treatment eﬀect on food intake reduction is larger in the second
trial type than in the ﬁrst, so again the treatment eﬀect is larger if the perceived
p is larger. Again, the outcome among treated increases more with the change in
p than the outcome among controls, and this is consistent with ρ>0. This can
be explained if the amount of food intake on days between the trial event days
(and in the morning of the trial event days) positively aﬀects the extent to which
one is able to have a reduced food intake when treated in the evening. After all,
one may want to increase the food intake early in the day and on days between
the trial events if one knows that p =1 /2 rather than p =0 .
We now turn to situations in which the ER is violated (so we adopt ρ2 ≥ 8c0γ
and we consider values of p close to 1/2). The estimator  βIV estimates a number
diﬀerent from β, where the sign of the diﬀerence is determined by ρ. Speciﬁcally,






It follows that as p increases from 0 to 1, there are two points at which  βIV makes
a discontinuous jump, and these jumps have opposite signs. This can be veriﬁed
empirically (although, again, heterogeneity in other parameters may complicate
31this).15 If one has a priori knowledge on the sign of the interaction of x and a
in f(x,a) then one can verify empirically that the sequence of the signs of the
jumps is correct. For example, if the interaction sign is negative, so treatment
and eﬀort are substitutes, then one would expect the estimated treatment eﬀect
to be relatively small for treatment probabilities close to 1/2.
Instead of comparing evaluation settings with diﬀerent observable distribu-
tions of Z, one might want to search for deeper instrumental variables aﬀecting a
speciﬁc unobserved model parameter, in order to assess predictions of the model
framework concerning parameter regions in which the ER is satisﬁed or violated.
However, if a parameter aﬀects the estimated treatment eﬀect in absence of the
ER, then typically it also aﬀects the treatment eﬀect if the ER is satisﬁed, so
an observed association between such instrumental variables and the estimated
treatment eﬀect is not informative on the predictions of the model framework
(unless such an instrumental variable is so strongly related to the parameter that
one can equate changes in one to changes in the other).
5 Conclusions
This paper takes the novel approach of using an economic framework to analyze
the validity of the exclusion restriction and the properties of the IV estimator.
The analysis has led to a large set of insights and implications for policy and
treatment evaluation.
The exclusion restriction is more likely to be violated if the outcome of interest
strongly depends on interactions between the agent’s eﬀort before the outcome is
realized on the one hand, and the agent’s treatment status on the other. We also
ﬁnd that the exclusion restriction is more likely to be violated if the candidate
instrument covers a large shift in policy intensity or if it divides the population
into groups of similar size.
Deliberate randomization of the intention to treat does not necessarily help. In
social experiments, the randomization outcome is typically available to the agent
at low cost. Moreover, the typical randomization probability of 1/2 corresponds
to a high incentive to acquire one’s realization. In fact, it may be better to use
a smaller or larger probability, because this reduces the incentive to acquire and
use the value of the candidate instrumental variable.
15Other predictions are that  βIV does not depend on p around p =1 /2 and that the discon-
tinuity jumps are at values at equal distance from 1/2, but these results depends crucially on
the functional forms for f(x,a)a n dc(a).
32Having a weak instrument does not helpeither. Weakness of the candidate
instrument, as deﬁned or measured in ways proposed in the literature, is not
directly related to the likelihood that the exclusion restriction is violated.
With discrete eﬀort, instrumental variable analyses that restrict attention to
agents with low or high resources (e.g. income) are more likely to be valid than
analyses that include agents with intermediate resource levels. The reason is that
for the former groups, the information is useless because it does not aﬀect optimal
eﬀort. In addition, for the low resource agents, it may be too expensive.
In case of violation of the exclusion restriction, the sign and the magnitude of
the bias are driven by the interaction term between the treatment status and the
agent’s eﬀort in the outcome. The magnitude of the bias also depends on higher-
order moments of the distribution of the candidate instrument. The strength of
the candidate instrument and the size of the actual causal treatment eﬀect do
not aﬀect the bias. In case of side eﬀects and uncertainty about the actual eﬀect,
it is the interaction eﬀect in the agent’s objective function that drives the bias,
rather than the interaction eﬀect in the outcomes.
If the circumstances are such that it is plausible that the exclusion restriction
is violated for the candidate instrumental variable, then IV cannot be applied.
One can still use IV estimation to test the null hypothesis of a zero causal treat-
ment eﬀect, since under this hypothesis the exclusion restriction is not violated.
However, to obtain eﬀect estimates, one needs to look for other sources of ex-
ogenous variation in the treatment status, like random variation in the timing
of the treatment, and impose a semi-parametric model structure (the so-called
“timing-of-events” approach). In the paper we demonstrate that one may also
exploit variation in the distribution of the candidate instrument across diﬀer-
ent evaluation settings. Alternatively, one may estimate a structural economic
model.
The results also shed light on a number of other issues in the evaluation litera-
ture. For example, they provide a behavioral explanation of the positive relation
between the randomization probability of a beneﬁcial treatment and the asso-
ciated treatment eﬀect estimate. Such a positive relation has been observed in
contexts in which a behavioral response is plausible. Further, as noted in the
introduction, medical researchers have found associations between the method-
ological quality of empirical treatment evaluation studies and the treatment eﬀect
estimates found in those studies. Our ﬁndings concerning the determinants of
the asymptotic eﬀect bias can be used to understand such associations. If studies
with inadequate concealment ﬁnd larger eﬀect estimates for a speciﬁc treatment,
then this indicates that the treatment and the other eﬀort towards the outcome
33are complements as outcome determinants.
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Appendix 1 Selective non-compliance
Suppose that agents can manipulate the probability distribution of their treat-
ment status X, by way of choosing an action a before X is realized. As an
extreme example, if the treatment status X is binary, they may switch treatment
status by choosing an appropriate a. Agents’ optimal a may depend on Z,w h i c h
may be acquired at a cost.
This model framework can be reformulated in terms of our framework, by
allowing a to aﬀect the distribution of X|Z, which we denote by G(X|Z;a).
If the agent does not acquire Z then he chooses action or eﬀort a0 leading to
G(X|Z;a0) which we denote by H(X|Z). We start oﬀ by assuming that a does
not aﬀect the expected outcome function f, so we write f := f(X) instead of
f(X,a). Note that this implies that the exclusion restriction is satisﬁed.
To see the connection to our framework, note that determining the optimal











The term in square brackets can now be interpreted as a new outcome function
 f and we can use the results derived earlier in the section to study the extent to
which agents acquire their value of z.
Under certain conditions, IV estimation accommodates selective non-compliance,
where it is (often tacitly) assumed that the compliance decision is made upon the
realization of the treatment status X. In the setupof this subsection, the comp li-
ance decision is made before the realization of X, but in this setupthe ER is not
violated either, because the actual outcome f only depends on X. Obviously, the
setupof this subsection and the framework earlier in the p ap er can be combined
by allowing the original f to depend on a as well.
Appendix 2 Proof of Proposition 3and some implications
First of all, recall that Pr(Z ≥ 0) = 1 and var(Z) > 0. From (18), if ρ =0t h e n
the asymptotic bias is zero.
16If z is a location parameter of the distribution of [X|Z = z;s], so that G(X|z;a)c a n




35Now consider the case ρ>0. From Subsection 3.2, the conditions on the
outcome function that are listed in the proposition amount to ψ0 > 0,ψ 1 ≥
0,ψ 2 ≥ 0. Also, c0 > 0. By substituting cov(Z,Z2)=E(Z3) − zE(Z2) into (18),
it follows that asymptotically  βIV − β has the same sign as
ψ1 + ρz

 µ3 − 2  µ2 +1
 µ2 − 1

(25)
where  µi := EZi/zi for i =2 ,3. Note that the denominator of the above term
in square brackets is proportional to var(Z) which is positive. Consequently, the
term in square brackets is positive iﬀ the numerator is positive. The latter is
equivalent to  µ3 >  µ2
2 − (  µ2 − 1)2. From Shohat and Tamarkin (1943)’s results
for the so-called Stieltjes Moment Problem it follows that a random variable Z
with Pr(Z ≥ 0) = 1 and var(Z) > 0 necessarily satisﬁes E(Z)E(Z3) > (E(Z2))2,
with the exception of the special case in which the support of Z consists of two
mass points, one of which is zero. The inequality is equivalent to  µ3 >  µ2
2,w h i c h
in turn implies that  µ3 >  µ2
2−(  µ2−1)2. For the special case in which the support
of Z consists of two mass points, one of which is zero, there holds that  µ3 =  µ2
2,
but also that  µ2 − 1 > 0, so that again  µ3 >  µ2
2 − (  µ2 − 1)2. Consequently, the
asymptotic bias is always positive.
Now consider the case ρ<0. From Subsection 3.2, the conditions on the
outcome function that are listed in the proposition amount to ψ0 > 0,ψ 1 >
0,ψ 2 > 0,Pr(X<
ψ1
−ρ|Z = z) = 1 for all possible realizations z,a n dψ2c0 +ρψ1 >
0, with c0 > 0. From equation (18), and by analogy to equation (25), we obtain




µ3 − 2zµ2 + z3
µ2 − z2 (26)
where µi := E(Zi). In Subsection 3.2 we saw that the parameter inequalities for
this case imply that Pr(Z<
ψ1
−ρ)=1 ,s oZ satisﬁes Pr(Z ∈ [0,−ψ1/ρ)) = 1. We
denote −ψ1/ρ by zu. The term (26) is negative iﬀ
−zu(µ2 − z
2)+µ3 − 2zµ2 + z
3 (27)
is negative. For convenience, we rewrite this in terms of central moments of Z.
Let κi := E(Z − z)i. Then (27) equals
κ3 − (zu − z)κ2 (28)
To sign this, we apply results for the so-called Hausdorﬀ Moment Problem (see
Shohat and Tamarkin, 1943, and Frontini and Tagliani, 1995). In particular, a





0)) > (E(Z0) − E(Z
2
0))
We take Z = zu · Z0,s ot h a tZ satisﬁes Pr(Z ∈ [0,z u)) = 1 and var(Z) > 0,
as required, and we use the notation z and µi to denote its moments. Clearly,
z = zuE(Z0)a n dµi = zi
uE(Zi




u(µ2 − z) − zu(µ3 − zµ2)+zµ3 − µ
2
2 > 0
and in terms of central moments of Z this simpliﬁes to
0 >κ
2
2 +( zu − z)[κ3 − (zu − z)κ2]
Since zu > z, this implies that κ3−(zu−z)κ2 < 0. Consequently, the asymptotic
bias is always negative. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Notice that the result for ρ<0 also applies if we allow for X and Z to be able to
attain the value zu. Also, notice that by substituting cov(Z,Z2)=E(Z3)−zE(Z2)
into (18) and by rewriting this in terms of central moments κi of Z,w eo b t a i n












By substituting β into the right-hand side, and by noting that κ3/(zκ2) equals
the skewness of Z times the coeﬃcient of variation of Z, we obtain equation (19)
in the main text. Also, by combining equation (29) with the proof for the case
ρ>0, it becomes clear that in that case  βIV and  βIV −β asymptotically increase
in ρ.
Appendix 3Proof of Proposition 4
Because c(a) is not parameterized, there are no parameterized expressions for
a(z)a n da0 either. However, from equations (3) and (4) it follows that with
the outcome function (6) and with the assumptions on f and on c(a) listed in
the proposition, the optimal eﬀort level a(z) in absence of the ER increases in z
(whereas with ρ<0 it decreases in z). Moreover,
c
 (a0)=ψ1 + ρz = c
 (a(z))
37implying that a(z)=a0. The latter means that the agent’s optimal eﬀort if he
knows that he has the average treatment intensity is equal to the agent’s optimal
e ﬀ o r ti fh ed o e sn o tk n o wh i si n t e n s i t y . W ew i l lu s et h i sb e l o w . N o t et h a tt h e
function a(z) cannot be constant over the support of Z.
If we substitute (6) into (13) then we obtain that
β = ψ2 + ρa0 (30)
Similarly, if we substitute (6) into (14) then we obtain that







Since a(z) is increasing, the second term on the right-hand side is positive. By
comparing (31) to (30), it then follows that if the third term on the right-hand
side of (31) is larger than or equal to ρa0 then asymptotically  βIV >β .S i n c e




which is equivalent to cov(Z,Z[a(Z) − a0]) ≥ 0. The latter can be written as
E(Z
2a(Z)) − zE(Za(Z)) − a0E(Z
2)+a0z
2 ≥ 0
which is equivalent to
E[Z(Z − z)(a(Z) − a0)] ≥ 0 (32)
Earlier in this proof we derived that a(z) is increasing and that a(z)=a0.T h e s e
two facts imply that a(z) ≥ a0 ⇐⇒ z>z. Consequently, (32) is true, and this
completes the proof.
Note that we can rewrite equation (31) as




ρE[Z(Z − z)(a(Z) − a0)]
var(Z)
(33)
Appendix 4 Proof of Proposition 5
In terms of our model and notation, Athey and Levin (2001) prove that the
assumptions on the function f imply that the optimal eﬀort level a(z) in absence
of the ER increases in z.
38The numerator on the right-hand side of (15), cov(E(f(X,a(Z))−f(X,a0)|Z),Z)
determines the sign of the asymptotic bias. Following the line of reasoning that
leads upto (32) in Ap p endix 3, it is easy to see that this numerator can be
written as
E[(Z − z) · E(f(X,a(Z)) − f(X,a0)|Z)] (34)
Since a increases, a(z) ≥ a(z) ⇐⇒ z ≥ z.N o wf is non-negative, increasing
and supermodular, so for any given x there holds that f(x,a(z)) ≥ f(x,a(z))
if and only if z ≥ z. By assumption, a(z)=a0, so for any given x there holds
that f(x,a(z)) ≥ f(x,a0) if and only if z ≥ z. The expectation over X|Z = z
of f(X,a(z))−f(X,a0) then also has the property that it is non-negative if and
only if z ≥ z. Consequently, (34) is non-negative, and this completes the proof.
Appendix 5 Proof of Proposition 7
Equations (22) and (23) imply that












Clearly, if ρ =0o ri fρ∗ = ψ∗
1 = 0 then the asymptotic bias is zero.
Now consider the other cases, so ρ  = 0, and, in addition, ρ∗  = 0 and/or
ψ∗









is positive. If ρ∗ =0t h e nψ∗
1 > 0 and again (36) is positive. Similarly, the proof
in Appendix 2 demonstrates that if ρ∗ < 0 then the expression in (36) divided
by ρ∗ is negative, taking into account the assumptions that then ψ∗
1 > 0a n d
Pr(Z<−ψ∗
1/ρ∗)=1 . S oi fρ∗ < 0 then again (36) is positive. By comparing
(35) to (36) it follows that the asymptotic bias has the same sign as ρ.N o t e
that we do not require assumptions on the range of values of ψ∗
0 and ψ∗
2 and the
support of X|Z in terms of −ψ∗
1/ρ∗ that correspond to those made concerning
the parameters of f. 
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